Both uniform and non-uniform results concerning the security of the Di e-Hellman key-exchange protocol are proved. First, it is shown that in a cyclic group G of order jGj = Q p ei i , where all the multiple prime factors of jGj are polynomial in log jGj, there exists an algorithm that reduces the computation of discrete logarithms in G to breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol in G and has complexity p maxf (p i )g (log jGj) O(1) , where (p) stands for the minimum of the set of largest prime factors of all the numbers d in the interval p?2 p p+1; p+2 p p+ 1]. Under the unproven but plausible assumption that (p) is polynomial in log p, this reduction implies that the Di e-Hellman problem and the discrete logarithm problem are polynomial-time equivalent in G. Second, it is proved that the Di e-Hellman problem and the discrete logarithm problem are equivalent in a uniform sense for groups whose orders belong to certain classes: there exists a polynomial-time reduction algorithm that works for all those groups. Moreover, it is shown that breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol for a small but nonnegligible fraction of the instances is equally di cult as breaking it for Some results of this paper have been presented at CRYPTO '94 26] 1 all instances. Finally, e cient constructions of groups are described for which the algorithm reducing the discrete logarithm problem to the Di e-Hellman problem is e ciently constructible.
Introduction
Two challenging open problems in cryptography are to prove or disprove that breaking the Di e-Hellman protocol 13] is computationally equivalent to computing discrete logarithms in the underlying group and that breaking the RSA system 40] is computationally equivalent to factoring the modulus. This paper is concerned with the rst of these problems.
The discrete logarithm problem
Let G be a nite cyclic group (written multiplicatively) generated by g. The discrete logarithm (DL) problem for the group G can be stated as follows:
Given g and a 2 G, nd the unique integer s in the interval 0; jGj ? 1] such that g s = a. The number s is called the discrete logarithm of a to the base g.
The DL problem is sometimes also de ned as the generally easier problem of nding any s satisfying g s = a, but if jGj is known the two problems are equivalent.
The Di e-Hellman key-exchange protocol and the Di eHellman problem
The Di e-Hellman (DH) protocol 13] allows two parties Alice and Bob, connected by an authenticated but otherwise insecure channel (for instance an insecure telephone line over which Alice and Bob authenticate each other by speaker recognition), to generate a mutual secret key which appears to be computationally infeasible to determine for an eavesdropper overhearing the entire conversation between Alice and Bob.
The protocol works as follows. Let G = hgi be a cyclic group generated by g for which the DL problem is believed to be hard. In order to generate a mutual secret key, Alice and Bob secretly choose integers s A and s B , respectively, at random from the interval 0; jGj ? 1]. Then they compute secretly a A = g s A and a B = g s B , respectively. Note that there exist e cient algorithms for exponentiation in groups. Finally, they exchange these group elements over the insecure public channel and compute a AB = a s A B = g s A s B and a BA = a s B A = g s B s A , respectively. Since a AB = a BA , this quantity can be used as a secret key shared by Alice and Bob. More precisely, they need to apply a function mapping elements of G to the key space of a cryptosystem.
It is unknown whether a group exists for which the DL problem is hard, but several candidate groups have been proposed. Examples are the multiplicative groups of large nite elds (prime elds 13] or extension elds), the multiplicative group of residues modulo a composite number 31], 32], elliptic curves over nite elds 36] , 21] , the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve over a nite eld 20] , and the class group of imaginary quadratic elds 7] .
The security of the DH protocol is based on the assumptions that the DL problem is hard to solve in G, and that this implies that it is hard to compute g s A s B from g s A and g s B .
We will refer to the problem of computing g s A s B from g s A and g s B as the Di e-Hellman (DH) problem. This paper is mainly concerned with the relationship between the DH and DL problems. It is clear that the DH problem cannot be more di cult than the DL problem because exponentiation in a group is e cient. Conversely, even when using a group for which the DL problem is hard, this does not immediately imply that the DH protocol is secure when using this group. However, we will show that for every group whose order is not divisible by the square of a large prime number, the DH problem cannot be substantially easier than the DL problem. Moreover, for certain classes of groups an e cient algorithm reducing the DL problem to the DH problem does not only exist but is e ciently constructible.
Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a general index-search problem is de ned and investigated, and some algorithms for computing discrete logarithms are described. In Sections 3 and 4 a technique for proving the equivalence of the DH and DL problems, using so-called auxiliary groups, is presented, and examples of suitable auxiliary groups, for instance elliptic curves or subgroups of the multiplicative group of a nite eld, are described. These two sections contain the main results of this paper. More precisely, a generalization of the result of 26] is proved in Section 3 which states that the DH and DL problems are equivalent for groups G for which appropriate auxiliary groups are given. The rst result of Section 4 is a non-uniform reduction of the DL problem to the DH problem: It is shown (under an unproven but plausible number-theoretic conjecture) that there exists, for every group whose order does not contain a multiple large prime factor, a polynomial-time algorithm computing discrete logarithms and making calls to an oracle solving the DH problem. The second result of Section 4 is a list of smoothness conditions (depending on jGj) which make the DH and DL problems equivalent in a uniform sense, i.e., an e cient reduction algorithm does not only exist but can also be found e ciently. In Section 5, several variants of the DH problem are de ned, and it is shown that they are (almost) as hard as the original DH problem. For instance, breaking the DH problem with small probability is equally hard as breaking it with arbitrarily high probability. In Appendix A an algorithm for nding generating sets of abelian groups is described. Appendix B contains some basic facts about Gr obner basis computations which are required in Section 4. In Appendix C we obtain results which are stronger than those of Sections 3 and 4 under the assumption that e cient algorithms exist for solving the DH problem in certain groups, and in Appendix D, we show how to construct DH groups for which the DH and DL problems are provably equivalent.
Related work Considerations on related topics can be found in 4], 3], 45], 28], 11], 10], and 42]. In 4]
, the notion of a black-box eld is introduced which makes more explicit the concept of computation with implicitly represented elements presented in 26] . Furthermore, the existence of a uniform reduction of the DL problem to the DH problem of subexponential complexity was proved in 4], using methods related to those of 26] and of Section 3 and Appendix C of this paper.
In 45] , the hardness of the DH problem (and hence of the DL problem) is proved in the generic model, i.e., for general-purpose algorithms that do not exploit any special property of the representation of the group elements. However, it was shown in 28] that the DH and DL problems are not computationally equivalent in a generic sense if the group order contains multiple large prime factors. In 11] , the hardness of the DL and DH problems modulo p is proved in special computational models. For example it was shown that the DH function cannot be interpolated by a low-degree polynomial.
An alternative construction to that of Section 5 for correcting a faulty oracle solving the DH problem is described in 45] . Finally, a comparison of the security of di erent DL based systems is given in 42]. 2 The index-search problem and algorithms for computing discrete logarithms . Multiplication with h corresponds to the above-mentioned permutation . Hence the baby-step giant-step algorithm is applicable for solving the DL problem. It is a generalpurpose algorithm that uses no particular properties of the representation of the group elements other than the uniqueness of the representation.
The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm
We describe a generic algorithm due to Pohlig and Hellman 37] which reduces the computation of discrete logarithms to the same problem in the minimal non-trivial subgroups. It plays a central role in the paper. In this section we describe a technique that allows to reduce the DL problem to the DH problem e ciently in groups G (more precisely, in all groups of certain orders) which satisfy certain conditions. In Section 3.1 we de ne the notion of a Di e-Hellman oracle, and the subsequent sections deal with the problem of computing discrete logarithms in a group G when given such an oracle for G. As a preparation for this, it is investigated in Section 3.2 what kind of computations are possible in the exponents (i.e., in the unknown discrete logarithms) of group elements when given a Di e-Hellman oracle. In Section 3.3, the concept of auxiliary groups is de ned, and in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 it is shown that these auxiliary groups are a tool for reducing the DL problem to the DH problem.
Computing discrete logarithms with an oracle solving the DH problem
In order to prove results concerning the equivalence of breaking the DH protocol and computing discrete logarithms we assume the availability of an oracle that solves the DH problem.
De nition 1 A Di e-Hellman (DH) oracle for a group G with respect to a given generator g takes as inputs two elements a; b 2 G (where a = g u and b = g v ) and returns the element g uv .
In the following we describe a polynomial-time reduction of the DL problem to the DH problem for certain classes of groups. Let G be a cyclic group generated by g for which the prime factorization of the order jGj is known, and let a = g s be a given group element for which we want to compute the discrete logarithm s using a DH oracle for G. In the examples considered below, the Embed algorithm computes a group element c that contains x + e as a coordinate, and the Extract procedure outputs this particular coordinate minus e.
In the next section we show how an abelian group H with bounded rank, de ned strongly algebraically over GF(p), and with smooth order can be used as an auxiliary group in the reduction of the computation of discrete logarithms modulo p in G to breaking the DH protocol for G. GF(p)) can be found e ciently with the property that from the explicit representation of c (and from e), the Extract algorithm leads to the element x. The reason is that because the Embed procedure uses only algebraic operations, it works also on implicitly represented inputs (where the group element of the output is also implicitly represented). This fact allows to reduce the computation of discrete logarithms in G (modulo p) to the same problem in the group H. The eld element x is computed from an implicit representation of x in four steps.
The reduction algorithm
Step 1. Use the Embed algorithm to obtain, when given an implicit representation of x and a random e 2 GF(p), an implicit representation of a group element c of H.
Step 2. Compute the discrete logarithm of c in H (with respect to some generator set).
Step 3. Compute c explicitly.
Step 4. Use the Extract algorithm to obtain x explicitly: x = Extract(c; e) :
We have to prove the stated complexity bounds for Step 2. The group H is abelian of rank r, i.e., H is isomorphic to Z n 1 Z nr for some n 1 ; : : : ; n r satisfying Q r j=1 n j = jHj and such that n j+1 divides n j for j = 1; : : : ; r ? 1.
Let h 1 ; : : : ; h r be a set of generators of H such that jhh j ij = n j and H is the internal product of the cyclic subgroups hh 1 i; : : : ; hh r i: H = hh 1 i hh r i :
(If no generator set for H is known it can be computed by the method described in Appendix A.) 1 The reader may wish to consult the survey paper 27], where a special case of this theorem is proved. More precisely, the proof is given under the assumption that all the auxiliary groups are cyclic elliptic curves over GF (p).
The element c 2 H has a unique representation c = r X j=1 k j h j 0 k j < n j (the group H is written additively). We address the problem of computing the coe cients k j . This can be done by a generalization of the PohligHellman algorithm (see Section 2), applied to implicitly represented group elements. The following is repeated for every prime q dividing jHj. We describe the rst and second iteration step of an algorithm that computes k j modulo the highest power of q dividing n j for all j = 1; : : : ; r. The algorithm uses v j (j = 1; : : : ; r) as local variables (initialized by v j 0).
For the rst step, let 1 be the number of generators h j whose order contains the same number of factors q as n 1 . In other words, (n 1 =q)h j is di erent from the unity e of H exactly for j = 1; : : : ; 1 transform the coordinates to an implicit representation, and test equality with (n 1 =q)c. Equality indicates that the t j are congruent to the coe cients k j modulo q. We set v j ? t j for these t j , and for 1 j 1 .
For the second step, let 2 be the number of elements h j whose order contains at most one factor q less than n 1 , i.e., (n 1 =q 2 )h j 6 = e exactly for j = 1; : : : ; 2 After repetition of this process up to the maximal q-power q g dividing n 1 , the resulting v j satisfy n 1 q g c = r X j=1 n 1 q g v j h j ; i.e., k j is congruent to v j modulo the highest power of q dividing n j = ord h j for j = 1; : : : ; r.
After running the algorithm for all primes q dividing jHj, one can compute the coe cients k j modulo ord h j by Chinese remaindering. However, it has been shown that in the model of generic algorithms, it is not possible to compute discrete logarithms in a group G more e ciently than in time ( p p) with a DH oracle for G, if p is a multiple prime factor of jGj 28] . The model of generic algorithms was introduced by Shoup 45] .
Intuitively, a generic algorithm is a general-purpose algorithm that works for all groups of a certain order, and that does not make use of any particular property of the representation of the group elements. Of course this result implies that in the generic model, a DH oracle cannot be e ciently used to construct the required subgroup oracles of Case 1 (a result which was proved already in 45]), and that for large p, p-th roots cannot be computed e ciently by a generic algorithm in a group of which the order is divisible by p 2 , even when a DH oracle is given for this group (Case 2) 28]. 4 Applicable auxiliary groups over GF (p) In this section, two classes of possible auxiliary groups satisfying the requirements speci ed in the previous section are described: elliptic curves over nite elds and subgroups of the multiplicative groups of nite elds. The applicability of Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves (see 20] and 9]) as auxiliary groups was demonstrated in 48].
Two types of results are derived as a consequence of the applicability of these classes of groups as auxiliary groups. First, a non-uniform reduction of the DL to the DH problem is shown. Under an unproven assumption on the existence of smooth numbers in small intervals, the complexity of this reduction is polynomial in log jGj, i.e., for every group (if no squares of large primes divide the order) there exists an algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in polynomial time if it is allowed to make calls to a DH oracle for this group. As mentioned already, such a reduction does not exist (in the model of generic algorithms) if the group order contains multiple large prime factors.
Moreover, we give a list of expressions A(p) in p with the property that an auxiliary group H p with order A(p) over GF(p) can e ciently be constructed. Theorem 2 then implies that if for each prime factor p of jGj one of the expressions in this list is smooth, then breaking the DH protocol and computing discrete logarithms are equivalent for G (if jGj has no multiple large prime factors). The equivalence of the DH and DL problems holds in a uniform sense for these groups because an e cient reduction algorithm, whose existence is guaranteed by the non-uniform result, can even be found e ciently. 41] . This implies the following non-uniform reduction of the DL problem to the DH problem.
De nition 6 For a number n, let (n) be the minimum, taken over all d in the interval n ? 2 p n + 1; n + 2 p n + 1], of the largest prime factor of d. (1) where (n; y) denotes the number of y-smooth integers n. This fact suggests that (n) is polynomial in log n.
This assumption implies that the algorithms of Theorem 3 run in time polynomial in log jGj, and this yields a polynomial-time non-uniform reduction of the DL problem to the DH problem for all groups whose orders are free of multiple large prime factors. Moreover, the reduction algorithms are generic, i.e., they depend only on the group order jGj of G, and they have a description of length linear in log jGj, namely the large prime factors of jGj and parameters of suitable elliptic curves.
Corollary 4 Let P be a xed polynomial. If the Smoothness Assumption is true, then for every group G = hgi whose order is free of multiple prime factors greater than B := P(log jGj), there exists a side-information string S of length at most 3 log jGj such that when given S, breaking the DH protocol for G is polynomial-time equivalent to computing discrete logarithms in G.
Remark. The group order of Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 varies in a larger interval of size n ? (n 3=4 ); n + (n 3=4 )], but the results about the distribution of the orders which are proved in 1] are not sucient to prove the existence of the side-information string without unproven assumption. The reason is that in 1] the existence of Jacobians with prime order is proved, whereas Jacobians with smooth order are required for our purpose.
In the model of generic algorithms the results described in Section 3.5 (see 28] , 45]) and in this section imply the following complete characterization of group orders n for which there exists an e cient generic algorithm computing discrete logarithms, making calls to a DH oracle for the same group.
Corollary 5 If the Smoothness Assumption is true, then there exists a polynomial-time generic algorithm computing discrete logarithms in cyclic groups of order n, making calls to a DH oracle for the same group, if and only if all the multiple prime factors of n are of order (log n) O(1) .
Construction of elliptic curves
For certain expressions A(p), elliptic curves over GF(p) with order A(p) can explicitly be constructed. The curve over GF(p) de ) multiplications in GF(p). We conclude that every subgroup of GF(p n ) (for n polynomial in log p) is de ned (n; (log p) O(1) )-algebraically over GF(p). For all n, GF(p n ) is a cyclic group. This implies that a subgroup of GF(p n ) is uniquely determined by its order jHj, or more precisely, for every divisor d of jHj there exists exactly one subgroup of GF(p n ) with jHj = d. Furthermore, all these subgroups are cyclic.
The next theorem states conditions on n and jHj under which H is de ned strongly algebraically over GF(p). 
for some l-degree polynomial g with GF(p k )-coe cients. 
Summary
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2, combined with the results of this section.
Corollary 7 Let P be a xed polynomial, let G be a cyclic group with generator g, and let B := P(log jGj). 5 Equivalence between variants of the DH problem
Introduction
In the previous sections we have proved results concerning the relationship between the security of the DH protocol and the hardness of the DL problem. However, in order to prove that the DH protocol is secure for a group in which the DL problem is hard, one has to show that the DH problem cannot be solved e ciently even with small probability of, say, 1%. Motivated by this, we show in this section that the assumption of a perfect DH oracle for the reduction process is unnecessarily strong and can be relaxed in many ways. In 5.2 we prove that a (probabilistic) DH oracle answering correctly with small probability is virtually as strong as a perfect DH oracle. For example, an oracle answering correctly with probability 1% can e ciently be transformed into an oracle that answers correctly with arbitrarily high probability. In Section 5.3, it is shown that the same holds for a DH oracle that answers correctly for the input (g u ; g v ) only if u = v. Finally, the relationship between the DH problem in G and in subgroups of G is investigated in Section 5.4.
"-DH-oracles
This section deals with DH oracles that answer correctly only with small (but non-negligible) probability. It is shown that such oracles are virtually as strong as perfect DH oracles. The problem of correcting faulty DH oracles was considered independently by Shoup 45] , who described a quite di erent approach. We introduce the notion of an "-DH-oracle for a cyclic group G with respect to a generator g. Note that such an \oracle" is probabilistic in general rather than deterministic.
De nition 7 For " > 0, an "-DH-oracle is a probabilistic oracle which returns for an input (g u ; g v ) the correct answer g uv with probability at least " if the input is uniformly distributed over G G.
The o set of the oracle's answer g t to the input (g u ; g v ) is de ned as t ? uv (mod jGj). A translation-invariant "-DH-oracle is an "-DH-oracle whose o set distribution is the same for every input (g u ; g v ).
A special case of (non-translation-invariant) "-DH-oracles are deterministic oracles answering correctly for a fraction " of all inputs. We proceed in two steps to prove that an "-DH-oracle can be transformed into a virtually perfect DH oracle. First, the oracle is made translation-invariant by randomization of the input, and then, the translation-invariant oracle is \ampli ed" to an (almost) perfect oracle.
Lemma 1 An "-DH-oracle for a cyclic group G with order jGj can eciently be transformed into a translation-invariant "-DH-oracle. More precisely, implementing one call to the latter requires one call to the former and O(log jGj) group operations. In the proof of Theorem 8 it is shown that a translation-invariant "-DHoracle can be transformed into an almost-perfect DH oracle. The straightforward approach to using a translation-invariant "-DH-oracle may at rst sight appear to be to run it O(1=") times until it produces the correct answer.
However, because the Di e-Hellman decision problem is di cult, a more complicated approach must be used. (The Di e-Hellman decision problem, which was rst mentioned in 5], is, for given g u , g v , and g w , to decide whether g w = g uv , and is of course at most as di cult as the DH problem.) Proof of Theorem 8. The basic idea of the ampli cation of the DH oracle is as follows. In a precomputation phase, which is independent of the actual input, the oracle's o set distribution is determined. Then, the oracle is called with the given input to compute the correct solution with overwhelming probability.
More precisely, the reduction from an "-DH-oracle to an oracle answering correctly with high probability consists of the following steps which we rst describe intuitively.
Step 1. The "-DH-oracle is transformed into a translation-invariant "-DHoracle.
Step 2. We compute an estimate " 0 for the probability that the (translationinvariant) oracle answers correctly.
Step 3. A list L 1 of group elements g e is computed with the property that g e is contained in L 1 if and only if the probability of the o set e is close to " 0 .
Step 4. A second list L 2 of group elements is generated which contains exactly those group elements that occur with frequency close to " 0 when the oracle is called with the input (g u ; g v ).
Step 5. The lists L 1 and L 2 have (with high probability) the property that the elements of L 2 are exactly the elements of L 1 multiplied by the group element g uv (which is itself contained in L 2 ). In order to determine this switch element, the lists aL 1 are generated for all elements a in L 2 (the list aL 1 contains exactly the elements al 1 , where l 1 is contained in L 1 ). The list L 2 is compared to all the lists aL 1 , and equality yields a candidate a for g uv .
Step 6. In case of one single candidate a for g uv , this is the output of the algorithm. In the case of several candidates and if the group order jGj is known, the discrete logarithms of all the candidates and of g u and g v are determined modulo the smooth part of jGj. This yields the correct candidate for g uv , which is then the output of the algorithm.
Note that the rst three steps are a precomputation which is independent of the particular input (g u ; g v ). The list L 1 which is generated in these steps is a reference list describing the o set behavior of the faulty oracle. We describe the steps in detail and analyze their correctness and e ciency.
Step 1. According to Lemma 1, one can construct a translation-invariant "-DH-oracle which uses O(log jGj) group operations and one call to an "-DH-oracle per call if jGj is known. If jGj is unknown, the number of group operations is O(log(jGj=(" 2 minfs; 1g))).
Step 2. Let := "=8. An event with probability at least 1 ? will be called almost certain. Let := "=10 and 0 := "=100 = " 2 =1000. Step 3. In this step the reference list L 1 is generated as follows. The proof does not depend on the choice of the constants (e.g., 1=10), which is somewhat arbitrary. Intuitively, we need that " and 0 " . We show that if jGj is known, the correct one of them can be determined.
Let p 1 ; : : : ; p l be the distinct prime factors of c 0 (they can be found in time O((log(1=")) Note that a DH oracle as obtained in Theorem 8 is virtually equivalent to a perfect DH oracle in a polynomial-time (or subexponential-time) reduction of the DL to the DH problem because the correctness of the output of a probabilistic algorithm computing discrete logarithms can be tested, and because only a polynomial (or subexponential) number of oracle calls is required for the computation of a discrete logarithm.
The squaring oracle
We describe an example of an oracle that is weaker than an "-DH-oracle with respect to the fraction of correctly answered inputs. Nevertheless, the oracle turns out to be as strong as the perfect oracle. We call an oracle that answers the input g u by g : (12) When given jGj, the square root g uv of (g uv ) 2 can e ciently be computed.
If jGj is odd, the square root is unique, but if jGj is even, there exist two square roots, g uv and g uv+ jGj 2 which can be computed e ciently (see Lemma 3) . Let jGj be even, and let 2 e be the maximal power of 2 dividing jGj. From g u and g v , one can compute u and v, and hence uv, modulo 2 e with O((log jGj) 2 ) group operations by the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm. Because jGj=2 is not a multiple of 2 e , we have uv 6 uv + jGj 2 (mod 2 e ) ; and one can determine the correct root g uv by computing the discrete logarithms of one of the roots modulo 2 e . Hence a squaring-DH-oracle is equally powerful as a perfect DH oracle in a group G whose order is known.
A probabilistic squaring-DH-oracle for a group with known order that answers correctly only with probability " (an "-squaring-DH-oracle) can be transformed into a translation-invariant " 3 -DH-oracle by randomizing the inputs in (12) . The complexity is O((log jGj) 2 ) group operations per call. This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 9 For every cyclic group G with generator g and known order jGj and for every > 0 there exists an algorithm solving the DH problem in G which makes calls to an "-squaring-DH-oracle and whose answer is correct with probability at least 1 ? . The number of oracle calls is O(log(1= " 
The security of subgroups
Throughout this section we assume that the order of G and its factorization are known. We address the question whether a subgroup is more or less secure than the entire group with respect to the DH protocol. Although the statement of Corollary 12 below is very intuitive (and an analogous result holds for the computation of discrete logarithms), the proofs of Theorems 10 and 11 are not trivial. First we give a criterion when a DH oracle for hgi can be e ciently transformed into a DH oracle for hg r i. More precisely, we will show that a subgroup of G is at most as secure as G with respect to the DH protocol if every large prime factor of the index of the subgroup occurs with the same multiplicity in the index and in the group order. We need the following lemma on the computation of p-th roots in a cyclic group G if p is a multiple prime factor of jGj. Note that for single prime factors p of jGj, a p-th root can be obtained by computing the z-th power for z : p ?1 (mod jGj=p). Lemma 3 Let G be a cyclic group with generator g, and let p be a multiple prime divisor of jGj. One of the p-th roots of a p-th power in G can be computed in time O((log jGj) 2 + p log jGj). Theorem 10 Let P be a xed polynomial. Let G be a cyclic group with generator g. If the number r is such that every prime factor of r is either smaller than B := P(log jGj) or has at least the same multiplicity in r as in G, then there exists an algorithm solving the DH problem in the group hg r i, making one call to the DH oracle for hgi and using a polynomial number of group operations per call.
Remark. Again, the conditions of the theorem are optimal. Shoup 45] has shown that if the conditions are not satis ed, then the construction of a subgroup oracle from an oracle for G is hard in the generic model. is possible). The DH algorithm for the group hg r i takes as inputs two elements (g r ) a and (g r ) b and must output (g r ) ab . Using the DH oracle for the group G = hgi with the same input, one obtains g r 2 ab , i.e., the r-th power of g rab . Now, g rab is computed from g r 2 ab by computing the r-th root. More precisely, the p f i i -th root of g r 2 ab has to be computed for all i with f i > 0, and the correct root, i.e., the particular root that is a power of g rab , must be determined. Assume that we have already computed Case 2: p i B and f i < e i . Here we repeat the following two steps f i times.
Step 1. Compute the p i -th roots of the group element.
Step 2. Decide which of the roots is a power of g rab and continue with this element.
Assume for some k = 2f i ? 
The following result is an immediate consequence of the above theorems.
Corollary 12 Consider a group G = hgi and a subgroup H = hg k i of G with (log jGj) O(1) -smooth index. The DH problem for H is polynomial-time equivalent to the DH problem for G.
Concluding remarks
We have presented a technique for reducing the DL problem in a group G to the DH problem in the same group e ciently when suitable auxiliary groups are given. One conclusion of this fact is that, under a plausible but unproven assumption on the existence of smooth numbers, for every group whose order does not contain a multiple large prime factor there exists a polynomial-time algorithm computing discrete logarithms and making calls to a DH oracle for the same group. In the generic model, it was proven that such a reduction cannot exist for groups whose order is divisible by the square of a large prime. A second conclusion is that solving the DH and DL problems is computationally equivalent for many classes of groups in a uniform sense. These are the groups for which suitable auxiliary groups can be e ciently constructed. Throughout this paper, we have assumed to know the group order and its factorization. Let p be a large prime factor of jGj. If It is possible that the algorithm makes a mistake here, i.e., that the generated element does not have maximal order. Such an error occurs only with probability exponentially small in the number of trials and can be detected as follows. In the case where ord The goal of this appendix is to complete the proof of Theorem 6, i.e., to show that the second condition also implies that H is de ned strongly algebraically over GF(p). In the rst part of the proof of Theorem 6 (given in Section 4.2), the key argument was that the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm allows to solve a univariate polynomial equation over a nite eld e ciently and with algebraic operations only. This led to an Embed algorithm with the required properties.
For the second part of this proof the result is required that a system of such equations can be solved. In Section B.1 we shortly describe the concept of Gr obner bases, which are a tool for solving such systems. Section B.2 completes the proof of Theorem 6.
B.1 Gr obner bases
Let F be a eld and R be the ring F x 1 ; : : : ; x n ] of the polynomials in x 1 ; : : : ; x n over F. Let further p i = 0 (where i = 1; : : : ; l and p i 2 R for all i) be a system of polynomial equations. We also write P = 0, where P := fp i g. Every basis of the generated ideal hPi in the ring R leads to an equivalent system of equations. Gr obner bases with respect to the lexicographic term ordering have the property that the system can be solved if univariate equations can be solved. The lexicographic term ordering is de ned as follows: We motivate the de nition of Gr obner bases 3 . Let f and g be polynomials, and let t be the leading term of g. One can reduce f modulo g if a monomial of f is a multiple of t, f = t + r. The reduction of f modulo g is then f ? t M(g) g ; (13) where M(g) denotes the leading monomial of g. Let Q be a set of polynomials. The reducer set of the polynomial f with respect to Q are the polynomials g in Q with the property that the leading monomial of f can be reduced modulo g. There exists a simple algorithm for a maximal reduction of a polynomial f modulo a set Q of polynomials based on (13 
s-poly(f; g) reduces to 0 modulo G. For given P, the third criterion leads to a simple algorithm for the computation of a Gr obner basis G of hPi by extending P. Algorithm (Buchberger) Choose any pair (f 1 ; f 2 ) in P P and compute a maximal P-reduction of s-poly(f 1 ; f 2 ). If it is di erent from zero, extend P by this polynomial. Repeat the process for all pairs, including the pairs with components added to P during the execution of the algorithm.
This algorithm can be improved by criteria stating whether s-poly(f; g) reduces to 0, such that the number of s-polynomial reductions is decreased. The complexity of Gr obner basis computations is a subject of ongoing research. If the system P = 0 has only nitely many solutions over C, the computation of a lexicographic Gr obner basis for hPi has complexity O(D n 
and s is the dimension of the ideal, s n. The following are key properties of Gr obner bases. Let P be a set of polynomials and G a monic Gr obner basis for hPi (where monic means that the coe cients of the leading monomials of all the polynomials are 1). The rst property is a criterion for solvability, and the second property implies, when using the lexicographic ordering, that a subset of the equations coming from the polynomials of the Gr obner basis is a system of triangular form and can be solved if univariate polynomial equations can be solved. The fact that (x i ) m i is the leading term of a polynomial implies that the variables x 1 ; : : : ; x i?1 do not occur in the polynomial. For example the polynomial with (x n ) mn as leading term is univariate (with the only variable x n ). Analogously, there is a polynomial containing x n?1 and x n only, etc.
B.2 Completing the proof of Theorem 6
Proof that Condition 2 is su cient. Let jHj = f(p) for some non-constant polynomial (with integer coe cients) f(x) dividing x N ?1, where N = O(1).
We show rst that we can assume without loss of generality that f(x) equals a cyclotomic polynomial n (x) for some n = O ( We show that a subgroup H of GF(p n ) with jHj = n (p) (for n = O (1)) is de ned strongly (n; )-algebraically over GF(p) for some = (log p) O(1) .
This proves the second part of Theorem 6, because a group which has a subgroup with this property has the property itself (the same Embed algorithm can be used). Let
c j x j (with c j 2 Z). Let further 0 ; : : : ; n?1 be a normal basis of GF(p n ) over GF(p).
We describe the Embed algorithm for H. Let x; e 2 GF(p) be given.
We compute, by a polynomial number of algebraic operations in GF(p), an element = ( 0 ; : : : ; n?1 ) such that x + e is one of the coordinates of , for instance x + e = 0 . Again, we need an alternative characterization of the fact that 2 H in terms of the GF ( The process works in an analogous way if some of the used groups are cyclic elliptic curves or Jacobians, provided an e cient algebraic (with respect to the underlying eld GF(p)) DH algorithm is given for these groups.
m?2 p m+1; m+2 p m+1]. A group G whose order contains only such large prime factors satis es the third property. Note that it is easy to construct, for a given n, a group G for the DH protocol whose order is a multiple of n. One possibility is to nd a multiple l of n (where l=n is small) such that l + 1 is prime and to use G = GF(l + 1) . An alternative is to use the construction of Lay and Zimmer 22] for nding an elliptic curve of order n. The second case is somewhat more involved. Primes p for which the designer knows an auxiliary group over GF(p) can be obtained by choosing a large smooth number m and using the method of Lay and Zimmer 22] for constructing a prime p together with an elliptic curve of order m. When given such prime factors of the group order, a group G can be found as described.
We now consider e cient constructions for the rst case. We generalize an algorithm, 
In a similar way, primes can be constructed such that curves of type trials when using the straightforward strategy).
